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Abstract. We present work in progress on a methodology for the engineering, 
validation and veriﬁcation of generic requirements using domain engineering 
and formal methods. The need to develop a generic requirement set for 
subsequent system instantiation is complicated by the addition of the high 
levels of veriﬁcation demanded by safety-critical domains such as avionics. We 
consider the failure detection and management function for engine control 
systems as an application domain where product line engineering is useful. The 
methodology produces a generic requirement set in our, UML based, formal 
notation, UML-B. The formal veriﬁcation both of the generic requirement set, 
and of a particular application, is achieved via translation to the formal 
specification language, B, using our U2B and ProB tools. 
Introduction  
The notion of software product line (also known as system family) engineering be-
came well established [14], after Parnas’ proposal [18] in the 70’s of information hid-
ing and modularization as techniques that would support the handling of program 
families. Product line engineering arises where multiple variants of essentially the 
same software system are required, to meet a variety of platform, functional, or other 
requirements. This kind of generic systems engineering is well known in the avionics 
industry; e.g. [12, 10] describe the reuse of generic sets of requirements in engine 
control and ﬂight control systems. 
Domain analysis and object oriented frameworks are among numerous solutions 
proposed to product line technology. In Domain-Speciﬁc Software Architecture [23] 
for example, the domain engineering of a set of general, domain-speciﬁc requirements 
for the product line is followed by its successive reﬁnement, in a series of system en-
gineering cycles, into speciﬁc product requirements. On the other hand [11] describes 
the Object-Oriented Framework as a “a reusable, semi-complete application that can 
be specialized to produce custom applications”. Here the domain engineering pro-
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Development Environment for Complex Systems). duces an object-oriented model that must be instantiated, in some systematic way, for 
each speciﬁc product required. In this work we combine object-oriented and formal 
techniques and tools in domain and product line engineering.  
It is widely recognized that formal methods (FM) technology makes a strong con-
tribution to the veriﬁcation required for safety-critical systems [15]. It is further rec-
ognized that FM will need to be integrated [3] in as “black-box” as possible a manner 
in order to achieve serious industry penetration. The B method of J.-R. Abrial [1, 19] 
is a formal method with good tool support [2, 8], and a good industrial track record, 
e.g. [9]. At Southampton, we have for some years been developing an approach of in-
tegrating formal speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation in B, with the UML [7]. The UML-B 
[22] is a proﬁle of UML that deﬁnes a formal modelling notation combining UML 
and B. It is supported by the U2B tool [20], which translates UML-B models into B, 
for subsequent formal veriﬁcation. This veriﬁcation includes model-checking with the 
ProB model-checker [13] for B. These tools have all been developed at Southampton, 
and continue to be extended in current work.  
Failure detection and management for engine control  
A common functionality required of many systems is to detect and manage the failure 
of its inputs. This is particularly pertinent in aviation applications where lack of toler-
ance to failed system inputs could have severe consequences. The failure manager 
ﬁlters inputs from the controlled system, providing the best information possible and 
determining whether a transducer or system component has failed or not. 
Inputs may be tested for magnitude, rate of change and consistency with other in-
puts. When a failure is detected it is managed in order to maintain a usable set of in-
put values for the control subsystem and provide ‘graceful degradation’. To prevent 
over-reaction to isolated transient values, a failed condition must be confirmed as per-
sistent before irreversible action is taken. Failure detection and management (FDM) 
in engine control systems is a demanding application area, see e.g. [6], giving rise to 
far more than a simple parameterizable product line situation. 
Our approach contributes to the failure detection and management domain by pre-
senting a method for the engineering, validation and veriﬁcation of generic require-
ments for product-line engineering purposes. The approach exploits genericity both 
within as well as between target system variants. Although product-line engineering 
has been applied in engine and ﬂight control systems [12, 10], we are not aware of 
any such work in the FDM domain. We deﬁne generic classes of failure-detection test 
for sensors and variables in the system environment, such as rate-of-change, limit, and 
multiple-redundant-sensor, which are simply instantiated by parameter. Multiple in-
stances of these classes occur in any given system. Failure conﬁrmation is then a ge-
neric abstraction over these test classes: it constitutes a conﬁgurable process of execu-
tion of speciﬁed tests over a number of system cycles, that will determine whether a 
failure of the component under test has occurred. Our approach is focussed on the 
genericity of this highly variable process.  Fault Tolerance 
This application domain (and our approach to it) includes fault tolerant design in two 
senses: tolerance to faults in the environment, and in the control system itself. The 
FDM application is precisely about maximizing tolerance to faults in the sensed en-
gine and airframe environment. The control system (including the FDM function) - is 
supported by a backup control system in a dynamically redundant design. This backup 
system - with distinct hardware/software design, with a reduced-functionality sensing 
fit - can be switched in by a watchdog mechanism if the main system has failed. 
In the narrower (and more usual) sense, we will be examining various schemes for 
designing fault tolerance into the FDM software subsystem. Work to date has speci-
fied and validated a generic requirements specification for FDM. As we apply refine-
ment techniques and technology to construct the design, we will consider various 
relevant approaches, such as driving the specification of a control system from envi-
ronmental requirements [25], or the use of fault-tolerant patterns for B specifications 
[27] and their refinements [26]. 
Methodology  
The process for obtaining a generic model of requirements is illustrated in Fig. 1. The 
ﬁrst stage is an informal domain analysis which is based on prior experience of devel-
oping products for the application domain of failure detection and management in en-
gine control. A taxonomy of the kind of generic requirements found in the application 
domain is developed and, from this, a ﬁrst-cut generic entity-relationship model is 
formed by naming and relating the generic requirements.  
The identiﬁcation of a useful generic model is a difficult process warranting further 
exploration. This is done in the domain engineering stage where a more rigorous ex-
amination of the ﬁrst-cut model is undertaken, using UML-B, U2B and ProB. The 
model is animated by creating typical instances of its generic requirement entities, to 
test when it is and is not consistent. This stage is model validation by animation, using 
the ProB and U2B tools, to show that it is capable of holding the kind of information 
that is found in the application domain. During this stage the relationships between 
the entities are likely to be adjusted as a better understanding of the domain is devel-
oped. This stage results in a validated generic model of requirements that can be in-
stantiated for each new application.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Process for obtaining the generic model For each new application instance, the requirements are expressed as instances of 
the relevant generic requirement entities and their relationships, in an instance model. 
The ProB model checker is then used to automatically verify that the application is 
consistent with the relationship constraints embodied in the generic model. This stage, 
producing a consistent instance model, shows that the requirements are a consistent 
set of requirements for the domain. It does not, however, show that they are the right 
set of requirements that will give the desired system behaviour. 
Our aim in future work, therefore, is to add dynamic features to the instantiated 
model in the form of variables and operations that model the behaviour of the entities 
in the domain and to animate this behaviour so that the instantiated requirements can 
be validated. We would prefer to add this behaviour in the generic model so that it too 
can be re-used by the instantiated model. 
During the domain analysis phase we found that considering the rationale for re-
quirements revealed key issues, which are properties that an instantiated model should 
possess. Key issues are higher level requirements that could be expressed at a more 
abstract level from which the generic model is a reﬁnement. The generic model could 
then be veriﬁed to satisfy the key issue properties by proof or model checking. This 
matter is considered in [21] which gives an example of reﬁnement of UML-B models 
in the failure management domain. 
The final stage is to validate the speciﬁc conﬁguration. This would be done by pro-
viding actual values to generic behaviours when the generic mode is instantiated. The 
resulting specific model could then be animated to validate its behaviour. 
Finally, we recognize the need for tools to support uploading of bulk system in-
stance deﬁnition data, as well as the efﬁcient and user-friendly validation/ debugging 
of said data. ProB could easily be enhanced to provide, for example, data counterex-
amples explaining invariant violations. 
Domain Analysis 
To obtain an initial understanding of the requirements domain we used domain analy-
sis in a similar style to Lam [12]. The first step was to define the scope of the domain 
in discussion with engine controller experts. An early synthesis of the requirements 
and key issues were formed, giving due attention to the rationale for the requirements. 
Considering the requirements rationale is useful in reasoning about requirements in 
the domain [12]. For example, the rationale for confirming a failure before taking ac-
tion is that the system should not be susceptible to spurious interference on its inputs. 
From the consideration of requirements rationale, key issues were identified which 
served as higher level properties required of the system. An example of such a prop-
erty would be that the failure management system must not be held in a transient ac-
tion state indefinitely. The rationale from which it has been derived is that a transient 
state is temporary and actions associated with this state may only be valid for a lim-
ited time. 
A core set of requirements were identified from several representative failure man-
agement engine systems. For example, the identification of magnitude tests with vari-
able limits and associated conditions established several magnitude test types; these types have been further subsumed into a general detection type. This type structure 
provided a taxonomy for classification of the requirements.  
Domain analysis showed that failure management systems are characterised by a 
high degree of fairly simple similar units made complex by a large number of minor 
variations and interdependencies. The domain presents opportunities for a high degree 
of reuse within a single product as well as between products. For example, a magni-
tude test is usually required in a number of instances in a particular system. This is in 
contrast to the engine start domain addressed by Lam [12], where a single instance of 
each reusable function exists in a particular product. Our methodology is targeted at 
domains such as failure management where a few simple units are reused many times 
and a particular conﬁguration depends on the relationships between the instances of 
these simple units. A first-cut entity relationship model was constructed from the units 
identified during the domain analysis stage. The entities identified during domain 
analysis were: 
•  INP Identiﬁcation of an input to be tested. 
•  COND Condition under which a test is performed or an action is taken. (A predi-
cate based on the values and/or failure states of other inputs). 
•  DET Detection of a failure state. A predicate that compares the value of an expres-
sion to be tested against a limit value. 
•  CONF Conﬁrmation of a failure state. An iterative algorithm performed for each 
invocation of a detection, used to establish whether a detected failure state is genu-
ine or transitory 
•  ACT Action taken either normally or in response to a failure, possibly subject to a 
condition. Assigns the value of an expression, which may involve inputs and/or 
other output values, to an output. 
•  OUT Identiﬁcation of an output to be used by an action 
Domain Engineering  
The aim of the domain engineering stage is to explore, develop and validate the ﬁrst-
cut generic model of the requirements into a validated generic model. At this stage 
this is essentially an entity relationship model, omitting any dynamic features (except 
temporary ones added for validation purposes).  
The first-cut model from the domain analysis stage was converted to the UML-B 
notation (Fig.2) by adding stereotypes and UML-B clauses (tagged values) as deﬁned 
in the UML-B proﬁle [22]. This allows the model to be converted into the B notation 
where validation and veriﬁcation tools are available. The model contains invariant 
properties, which constrain the associations, and ensures that every instance is a mem-
ber of its class. To validate the model we needed to be able to build up the instances it 
holds in steps. For this stage a constructor was added to each class so that the model 
could be populated with instances. The constructor was defined to set any associations 
belonging to that class according to values supplied as parameters. OUT
COND DET
1 0..*
+dcond
1 0..*
ACT
1
1..*
+aOut
1
1..*
1
0..*
+aCond 1
0..*
INP
CONF
1
1..*
1
+dets 1..*
1..* 0..* +tAct 1..* 0..*
0..* 0..*
+pAct
0..* 0..*
0..* 0..*
+hAct
0..* 0..*
1
1
+input
1
1
 
Fig. 2. Final UML-B version of generic model of failure management requirements  
The model was tested by adding example instances using the animation facility of 
ProB and examining the values of the B variables representing the classes and asso-
ciations in the model to see that they developed as expected. ProB provides an indica-
tor to show when the invariant is violated. Due to the ‘required’ (i.e. multiplicity 
greater than 0) constraints in our model, the only way to populate it without violating 
the invariant would be to add instances of several classes simultaneously. However, 
we found that observing the invariant violations was a useful part of the feedback dur-
ing validation of the model. Knowing that the model recognises inconsistent states, is 
just as important as knowing that it accepts consistent ones. The model was re-
arranged substantially during this phase as the animation revealed problems. Once we 
were satisﬁed that the model was suitable, we removed the constructor operations to 
simplify the corresponding B model for the next stage. 
The next stage is to add behaviour to the generic model by giving the classes op-
erations. In future work we will investigate the best way to introduce this behaviour 
during the process. It may be possible to add the behaviour after the static model has 
been validated as described above. Alternatively, perhaps the behaviour will affect the 
static structure and should be added earlier. In either case, we aim to formalise the ra-
tionale described in the domain analysis and derive the behaviour as a refinement 
from this. 
Requirements for a specific application 
Having arrived at a useful model we then use it to specify the requirements for a par-
ticular application by populating it with class instances. We use ProB to check the ap-
plication is consistent with the properties expressed in the generic model. This 
veriﬁcation is a similar process to the previous validation but the focus is on possible 
errors in the instantiation rather than in the model. The application is ﬁrst described in tabular form. The generic model provides a template for the construction of the tables. 
Each class is represented by a separate table with properties for each entry in the table 
representing the associations owned by that class. The tabular form is useful as an ac-
cessible documentation of the application but is not directly useful for veriﬁcation. To 
verify its consistency, the tabular form is translated into class instance enumerations 
and association initialisation clauses attached to the UML-B class model. This is done 
manually, which is tedious and error prone, but automation via a tool is envisaged.  
ProB is then used to check which conjuncts of the invariant are violated. For our 
FDM example, several iterations were necessary to eliminate errors in the tables be-
fore the invariant was satisﬁed. Initially, testing of the instantiation caused an invari-
ant violation. The ProB ‘analyse invariant’ facility provides information about which 
conjuncts of the invariant are violated. For example, a few conjuncts from the FDM 
example are shown: 
(ACT:POW(ACT_SET)) == TRUE  
(OUT:POW(OUT_SET)) == TRUE  
(aOut:TotalSurjection(ACT,OUT)) == false  
(aCond:(ACT-->COND)) == false 
We found that the analyse invariant facility provided useful indication of where the 
invariant was violated (i.e. which conjunct) but, in a data intensive model such as this, 
it is still not easy to see which part of the data is at fault. It would be useful to show a 
data counterexample to the conjunct (analogous to an event sequence counterexample 
in model checking). This is another area for potential tool support. 
Classification of problems 
It would be useful to classify the kinds of problems found during animation and veri-
fication in order to better understand the source of problems and improve the re-
quirements engineering process. So far, we have found that problems can be classified 
on a methodological stage basis.  Possible categories on this basis, some of which we 
have experienced, are as follows. 
•  Verification of generic model – the generic model is inconsistent or incor-
rect 
•  Validation of generic model – the generic model is correct and consistent 
but does not reflect the generic requirements 
•  Validation of generic requirement – the generic model works as expected 
but animation leads expert to review generic requirements 
•  Verification of instantiation - the instantiation is inconsistent with the ge-
neric model because of an incorrect instantiation 
•  Verification of instantiation - the instantiation is inconsistent with the ge-
neric model because the generic model is inadequate 
•  Validation of instantiation - the instantiation is consistent with the generic 
model but does not reflect the specific requirements •  Validation of specific requirements - the instantiation is consistent with 
the generic model but animation leads expert to review specific require-
ments 
In the future, when behavioural features are modelled, we expect to find other ways of 
classifying problems. For example we may be able to distinguish functional areas that 
are prone to incorrect specification. 
Conclusion  
In this paper we have discussed a product-line approach to the rigorous engineering, 
validation and veriﬁcation of generic requirements for critical systems such as failure 
management and detection for engine control. The approach can be generalised to any 
relatively complex system component where repetitions of similar units indicate an 
opportunity for parameterised reuse but the extent of differences and interrelations be-
tween units makes this non-trivial to achieve. The product-line approach amortises the 
effort involved in formal validation and veriﬁcation over many instance applications. 
So far we have considered the static, entity-relationship features of the requirements. 
In future work we aim to extend the approach to consider also the detailed meaning 
(i.e. dynamic behaviour) of these entities. 
Two broad areas of future work are indicated by the case study, both linking to re-
lated work on Product Line Engineering (PLE). The first concerns instance data man-
agement, the second variability vs. commonality in the generic model.  
For a product family such as FDM at ATEC as currently envisaged, instance data 
management is in principle straightforward. This is because no system in-
stance/variant requirements are defined at the generic level – all structure and behav-
iour is specified in terms of a single generic model. Instance/variant requirements are 
captured completely by instance-level data. This means that all instance data struc-
tures are defined in terms of the generic class definitions. Therefore, the data for a 
system instance is simply defined as a subset of the database of all required instance 
specifications; tooling is thus a straightforward database application.  
Instance management becomes more complex when variability is required in the 
generic model. This is the usual state of affairs in PLE. The mobile phone scenario of  
[16] is typical, where each system instance is defined by a distinct set of functional 
features, aimed at a specific market segment and target price. Features are not in gen-
eral simply composable, and the totality of features cannot in general be specified in 
one generic model: variability specification is required in the generic model. To date 
approaches to this (such as [16]) have been in the obvious syntactic form: in ATEC 
for example, variants on the generic model for other engine manufacturers might be 
described as extra colour-coded classes, associations, states, events etc. A system 
variant (or sub-family) would thus be defined in terms of some colour-combination 
submodel. A more sophisticated metamodelling approach to variability specification, 
based on the Model-Driven Architecture of the OMG, has recently been proposed 
[17]. 
Future work will investigate developing such variability and tooling issues in the 
ATEC context, using the UML-B and refinement approaches already discussed. The application of refinement approaches to PLE to date has been modest, e.g. [5, 24], and 
has, in our view, much potential. Retrenchment, a generalizing theory for refinement, 
has been investigated in a feature engineering context [4], and may well also be useful 
in PLE. 
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